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MISSION CREEP AND WIRETAP ACT ‘SUPER
WARRANTS’: A CAUTIONARY TALE
Jennifer S. Granick,* Patrick Toomey,** Naomi Gilens*** &
Daniel Yadron, Jr.****
Congress enacted the Wiretap Act in 1968 in an effort to combat
organized crime while safeguarding the privacy of innocent
Americans. However, the Act instead served to legitimize wiretapping,
and its privacy protections have eroded over time. As a result, there
has been a significant increase in wiretapping in the decades since the
Act’s passage. As technology evolves, the Wiretap Act does less to
protect Americans’ private communications from government
interception. Nevertheless, policy makers see the Wiretap Act, with its
“super-warrant” procedures, as the gold standard for statutory
privacy protection. To the contrary, when considering how to regulate
new and powerful surveillance technologies, advocates must not
reflexively rely on the language of the Wiretap Act as a model for
adequate privacy safeguards. They must consider whether, given the
Act’s apparent flaws, it is possible to meaningfully balance the
invasiveness of a new technique with the preservation of individual
privacy. If so, drafters should focus on crafting statutory language
that better implements the intended safeguards of the Act than the Act
itself has. This Article describes the deterioration of the Wiretap Act’s
protections and should serve as a cautionary tale to advocates as they
propose new legislation in the face of modern surveillance tools.
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INTRODUCTION
As new surveillance capabilities proliferate, civil liberties
advocates strive to protect individuals’ privacy rights in the face of
novel and intrusive investigative tools. Often, advocates hold up the
“super warrant” procedures required to conduct a wiretap as the gold
standard for strong privacy protections. A review of the history of the
Wiretap Act, however, shows that even a super warrant can fail to
adequately protect privacy in the face of new surveillance techniques.
Advocates need to think more broadly about additional safeguards.
And, some investigative techniques may be so dangerous that there are
no regulations that could balance their invasiveness with civil liberties
and the public’s safety.
The Wiretap Act (Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, also called “Title III”) requires a super
warrant to authorize government wiretapping. In addition to the
traditional warrant requirements of probable cause and particularity,
Title III limits wiretapping to investigations of certain predicate
offenses; it requires that investigators show necessity; and it mandates
minimization of intercepted communications. Often, advocates see
these additional Title III elements as providing strong protection for
personal civil liberties. However, the evolution of Title III’s
protections and the exponential growth of wiretapping is a cautionary
tale. More skepticism about the adequacy of a Title III “superwarrant” requirement is warranted.
This Article assesses the conditions and frequency of wiretapping
before and after Congress passed Title III. Part I describes how
wiretaps were used, and how they were regulated, in the decades
leading up to Congress’s passage of Title III. Part II assesses
Congress’s purpose in passing Title III. Using both qualitative
assessments and historical wiretap data, Part III assesses how law
enforcement’s use of wiretapping changed following Title III’s
passage. Part IV examines how Title III’s privacy-protective measures
have developed and functioned in practice over the past five decades.
The lesson that emerges from this survey is significant. Though
intended to provide a set of strong privacy protections that would limit
wiretapping to only the most serious investigations, and would ensure
that it was used only as a tool of last resort, Title III legitimized a
practice that President Lyndon B. Johnson, many lawmakers, and the
ACLU wanted to outlaw in all but the most sensitive national security

(8) 52.4_GRANICK (DO NOT DELETE)

1/6/2020 12:39 PM

434

[Vol. 52:431

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

investigations. The data available and qualitative assessments suggest
that wiretapping became exponentially more common after 1968.
Moreover, the privacy safeguards imposed by Congress in Title III
have eroded over time or have been demonstrably less effective than
initially imagined. Title III may not be the cause of this dramatic
increase in law enforcement’s reliance on wiretapping, but it didn’t
prevent it, either.
Privacy advocates therefore cannot be confident that a Title III
warrant requirement always will be an adequate safeguard. Currently,
the Wiretap Act is falling short of the goal of constraining
eavesdropping. Privacy-seeking proposals will have to take the
failures of the current statutory regime into account. It will be difficult
to ensure that regulation will stop invasive law enforcement
techniques from metastasizing over time. Civil libertarians need to
look beyond the current language of Title III for additional or different
tools to constrain invasive surveillance.
DISCUSSION
I. WIRETAPPING WAS SPORADIC AND CONTROVERSIAL
BEFORE TITLE III
This Part assesses the frequency and conditions of wiretapping
before Title III. First, it assesses government wiretapping policies
before 1968. Second, it provides an overview of efforts by President
Johnson, lawmakers, and the ACLU to outlaw wiretapping for all but
the most serious national security investigations. Ultimately, through
Title III, Congress sought to serve law enforcement needs while
mitigating widespread privacy concerns about wiretaps by
regulating—rather than banning—the invasive investigatory tool.
Nevertheless, the regulations have not stopped wiretapping from
becoming a widely-used investigation technique.
A. 1928–1946: Wiretapping Grows Through a Loophole
Warrantless federal wiretapping grew in fits and starts during the
first half of the twentieth century. To some extent, its use depended
“on the personal convictions of those in office.”1 Though federal
1. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE REVIEW OF FED. & STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAPPING
&
ELEC.
SURVEILLANCE,
NWC
REPORT
at
36
(Apr. 30,
1976),
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=728874 [hereinafter NWC Report].
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agents had used wiretapping to track down bootleggers,2 in early 1928,
Attorney General John G. Sargent prohibited agents at the Bureau of
Investigation—the precursor to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI)—from wiretapping for “any reason.”3 Months later, the U.S.
Supreme Court, in Olmstead v. United States,4 held that wiretapping
did not constitute “a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.”5 Although the Court invited Congress to prohibit
wiretapping via statute,6 lawmakers did not immediately do so.7
Not long after, in 1931, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
announced a new policy allowing agents to wiretap, provided that they
obtain a bureau chief’s approval, “after consultation with the assistant
attorney general (AAG) in charge of that case,”8 and show probable
cause (at least internally).9 The policy was intended for use in
investigations targeting “syndicated bootleggers,”10 but mission creep
appeared by year’s end. In December 1931, Attorney General William
D. Mitchell expanded wiretapping to “exceptional cases where the
crimes are substantial and serious, and the necessity is great.”11 The
bureau chief and AAG on the case also needed to be satisfied that “the
persons whose wires are to be tapped are of the criminal type.”12 This
DOJ policy lasted for the remainder of the 1930s.13
During this period, Congress passed the Federal Communications
Act of 1934.14 The Communications Act prohibited persons from
intercepting communications or divulging or publishing the contents
of intercepted communications, except with authorization by the

2. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
3. NWC Report, supra note 1, at 35.
4. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
5. Id. at 466.
6. Id. at 465.
7. NWC Report, supra note 1, at 35 (“Bills were introduced in Congress in 1929 and 1931
to prohibit wiretapping, but were never enacted.”).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. n.22 (citing Intelligence Activities Senate Resolution 21: Hearing on the National
Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights Before the S. Select Comm. to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong. 67 (1975) (prepared statement of
Edward H. Levi, Att’y Gen. of the United States)).
13. NWC Report, supra note 1, at 35.
14. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1934).
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sender.15 The Communications Act did not explicitly address
wiretapping by law enforcement specifically.16 In Nardone v. United
States,17 the Supreme Court interpreted it to prohibit government
agents from intercepting communications as well.18 Speaking in moral
terms, the Court held that the statute applied to federal agents, in part
because “[f]or years controversy has raged with respect to the morality
of the practice of wire-tapping by officers to obtain evidence. It has
been the view of many that the practice involves a grave wrong.”19
The Court doubled down two years later, holding that evidence
derived from intercepted communications was inadmissible at trial.20
By 1940, Attorney General Robert H. Jackson again completely
banned wiretapping by federal agents, describing it as an “unethical
tactic[].”21
The pause in eavesdropping was short-lived.22 In May 1940,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote Jackson a confidential memo
arguing that the Nardone decisions did not apply to national security
investigations.23 Roosevelt then authorized DOJ to use wiretapping in
investigations of alleged “subversive activities of the United States
government,” asking Jackson to limit the investigations “insofar as
possible to aliens.”24 A year later, Jackson—just before his nomination
to the Supreme Court—informed Congress of a statutory loophole
DOJ had exploited.25 The Communications Act, Jackson wrote, only
proscribed divulging intercepted communications—not collecting
intercepted communications.26 DOJ policy post-Nardone was to use
wiretapping for intelligence purposes.27
DOJ wiretaps grew quickly during World War II. DOJ conducted
six wiretaps in 1940.28 In 1944: 517.29 Though initially justified by
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

47 U.S.C. § 605 (2012).
NWC Report, supra note 1, at 35.
302 U.S. 379 (1937).
Id. at 384.
Id.
Nardone v. United States (Nardone II), 308 U.S. 338, 340–41 (1939).
NWC Report, supra note 1, at 36.
Id. (“This total ban lasted only about two months, however.”).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934)).
Id.
Id.
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wartime needs, wiretapping did not go away when the war ended. In
1946, Attorney General Tom C. Clark—another future Supreme Court
Justice—warned President Harry Truman of a “very substantial
increase in crime.”30 He proposed expanding federal wiretaps to cases
“vitally affecting the domestic security, or where human life is in
jeopardy.”31 Truman approved the proposal set forth in Clark’s
letter.32
B. 1956–1967: The Public and the President
Revolt Against Wiretapping
Between World War II and the passage of Title III, government
wiretapping faced such a backlash that it was nearly outlawed.33 In
1956, the Pennsylvania Bar Association Endowment commissioned a
nationwide study of “wiretapping practices, laws, devices, and
techniques.”34 The study’s authors went on to write The
Eavesdroppers, a 1959 nonfiction best-seller that convinced many
Americans that “in some ways Orwell’s fictitious world is already in
existence.”35 The book detailed how telephone companies voluntarily
provided secret wiretaps in “Boston, Chicago, and New Orleans, with
the understanding that the police would not disclose the telephone
companies’ cooperation to the public.”36 Still the number of
wiretaps—at least at the federal level—remained relatively stable
during this period.37
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.; see also Trevor W. Morrison, The Story of United States v. United States District Court
(Keith): The Surveillance Power, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 287 (Christopher H. Schroeder
& Curtis A. Bradley, eds. 2008) (citing Letter from Tom C. Clark, Att’y Gen. to President Harry S.
Truman (Jul. 17, 1946)). Truman’s handwritten approval, appended to the bottom of Clark’s letter,
is dated July 17, 1947. That seems to have been an error. Cf. United States v. United States District
Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 310 (1972) (treating 1946 as the date of Truman’s authorization).
33. NWC Report, supra note 1, at 38–39.
34. Brian Hochman, Eavesdropping in the Age of The Eavesdroppers; or, The Bug in the
Martini Olive, POST45 (Feb. 3, 2016), http://post45.research.yale.edu/2016/02/eavesdropping-inthe-age-of-the-eavesdroppers-or-the-bug-in-the-martini-olive/.
35. Mairi MacInnes, The Eavesdroppers, by Samuel Dash, Robert E. Knowlton, and Richard
F. Schwartz, COMMENTARY (Mar. 1960), https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/theeavesdroppers-by-samuel-dash-robert-e-knowlton-and-richard-f-schwartz/.
36. Brief for the Rutherford Institute as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9, Dahda v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 1491 (2018) (No. 17-43).
37. Federal agents initiated 285 wiretaps in 1952, 300 wiretaps in 1953, and 322 wiretaps in
1954. Electronic Surveillance Within the United States for Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Hearing
Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th Cong. 86 (1975) (testimony of Edward H. Levi,
Att’y
Gen.
of
the
United
States),
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In the meantime, the Supreme Court again limited the use of
wiretapping in federal courts.38 While the fruits of federal wiretapping
remained inadmissible under Nardone, federal agents had developed
a workaround. Many states, most famously New York, had permissive
government wiretap statutes. Because Nardone did not apply to the
states, federal prosecutors had started using evidence from state
wiretaps in federal courts.39 In 1957, the Court held this, too, was
unlawful.40
During the late 1950s, California, Florida, Indiana, Illinois, and
New Jersey either banned wiretapping or “made moves to shore up old
statutes that had the same effect.”41 In 1965, President Johnson
reinstated a ban on federal wiretapping barring a threat to national
security and approval from the Attorney General.42
To be sure, eavesdropping had support during this era. Many in
law enforcement and the Kennedy Administration supported
wiretapping, at least in the context of organized crime.43 The
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice famously said restrictive wiretapping laws were “intolerable”
because of the telephone’s “relatively free use” by mobsters.44 New
York, in the meantime, had made prodigious use of its own state
wiretap statute. In 1962, the District Attorney of New York told
Congress “that ‘without [wiretaps] my own office could not have
convicted’ ‘top figures in the underworld.’”45
In 1967, however, three key things happened that created a real
prospect of a United States free from prolific government wiretapping.
First, President Johnson proposed in his State of the Union address
that the U.S. “should outlaw all wiretapping—public and private—
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/94electronic_surveillance.pdf
[hereinafter Levi Testimony].
38. NWC Report, supra note 1, at 37–38.
39. See Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 97 (1957) (“The question presented by
petitioner is whether evidence obtained as the result of wiretapping by state law-enforcement
officers, without participation by federal authorities, is admissible in a federal court.”).
40. Id. at 105–06.
41. Hochman, supra note 34.
42. NWC Report, supra note 1, at 39; see also Levi Testimony, supra note 37, at 87 (stating
that nonconsensual wiretapping is permitted in national security investigations with consent of the
Attorney General).
43. NWC Report, supra 1, at 39.
44. PRES. COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 201, 203 (1967), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf.
45. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 61 (1967) (quoting Congressional testimony).
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wherever and whenever it occurs, except when the security of this
Nation itself is at stake—and only then with the strictest governmental
safeguards.”46
Second, the Johnson Administration then proposed and lobbied
for a national ban on government wiretapping—state and federal—
through the Right of Privacy Act of 1967.47 There is reason to believe
the Act’s supporters were centrists on privacy. The American Civil
Liberties Union expressed “strong reservations” due to the Right of
Privacy Act’s national security exception.48
Third, in Berger v. New York,49 the Supreme Court struck down
New York’s wiretap statute.50 The New York wiretap law’s privacy
controls were lax by contemporaneous standards. Officers needed
court approval, but they only had to show “reasonable grounds to
believe they could find evidence of crime,” rather than probable
cause.51 Police could use the tactic to investigate any crime.52 The law
also allowed officers to extend a two-month wiretap based on a
showing of the “public interest.”53 The Court also faulted the statute
for not requiring officers to “‘particularly describ[e]’ the
communications, conversations, or discussions to be seized.”54 Six
months after Berger, the Court decided Katz v. United States,55
explicitly holding that an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his conversations.56 The Court reiterated what the
government would need to do to justify this incursion.57 In this way,
the Court effectively laid out a blueprint for Congress to permit and
regulate wiretapping consistent with the Fourth Amendment.

46. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 2–14 (Jan. 10,
1967).
47. H.R. 5386, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2514 (1967).
48. The ACLU, for instance, lobbied against the national security exception and argued it at
least should be more narrowly defined. House Rewrites and Passes Safe Streets Bill, CONG, Q.
ALMANAC (1967), http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal67-1313006. Congressional media
quoted an ACLU spokesman as saying, “a strike by the Teamsters or the steel industry could be
held by a court to imperil national security, under the Taft-Hartley Act.” Id.
49. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
50. Id. at 64.
51. Id. at 54.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 59.
54. Id.
55. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
56. Id. at 351–53.
57. Id. at 355.
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II. CONGRESS PASSED TITLE III TO EMBRACE WIRETAPPING
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES
A. Passage of Title III
In 1968, responding to these developments, Congress enacted
Title III. It appears Congress felt squeezed between “being urged to
authorize eavesdropping in order to combat crime” and
“counterpressures to ban it in order to protect privacy.”58 Title III,
therefore, “was enacted as a compromise” between a “total ban on
electronic surveillance” and lax “limit[s] [on] the use of a technique
claimed by many to be a vital tool in fighting crime.”59 Though the
“major purpose of Title III is to combat organized crime,”60 Congress
identified one of the Act’s purposes as “safeguard[ing] the privacy of
innocent persons” by placing the issuance of wiretap orders under the
continuing supervision of the courts and limiting their use to “certain
major types of offenses and specific categories of crimes with
assurances that the interception is justified and that the information
obtained thereby will not be misused.”61
The key elements of Title III include:
• The statute generally prohibits interception of wire or
radio communications without a warrant.62
• To obtain a warrant, investigators must show probable
cause that the interception will provide evidence that “an
individual is committing, has committed, or is about to
commit a particular offense.”63
• In addition, investigators must show “necessity”: that they
have already tried other investigative means and failed or
that such techniques are likely to be unsuccessful or too
dangerous.64
• The statute authorizes the use of wiretaps only in
investigations of certain offenses, as listed.65

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

EDITH J. LAPIDUS, EAVESDROPPING ON TRIAL 13 (1974).
NWC Report, supra note 1, at xiii.
S. REP. NO. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2157.
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 801(d).
18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012).
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3).
Id. § 2518(1)(c).
Id. § 2516.
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•

The statute requires investigators to “minimize”
communications overheard in the course of a wiretap—
that is, to avoid recording, collecting, or retaining
innocent or irrelevant conversations.66
• The statute requires the government to provide notice of
wiretaps in various circumstances, in order to inform
individuals when the government has intruded on their
private communications.67
• The statute provides a mandatory suppression remedy for
violations of the wiretapping requirements.68
• The statute also provides civil remedies for violations.69
Though enacted as a compromise, Title III legitimized and
normalized wiretapping as a tool in ordinary criminal investigations.70
As Senators Hart and Long wrote in their portion of the Senate Report,
“the proposed legislation legitimize[d] a practice of law enforcement”
that had, until then, been “banned by the courts.”71
B. Early Assessments of Title III by Policymakers
and Law Enforcement
In the decade after Title III’s passage, most policymakers came
to view the wiretap law as a successful balance between law
enforcement and privacy. One of Title III’s compromise provisions
was the creation of a National Wiretap Commission.72 The
Commission’s 1976 report on state and federal wiretapping offered a
mostly positive assessment of Title III’s effects on law enforcement
and privacy.73 The Report offered the following conclusions:

66. Id. § 2518(5).
67. Id. § 2518(8)(d).
68. Id. § 2515.
69. Id. § 2520.
70. See James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age: Revitalizing the
Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 65, 75 (1997) (“Wiretapping
is no longer confined to violent and major crimes. Although Congress recognized in 1968 that
wiretapping was an extraordinary technique that should be used only for especially serious crimes,
the list of offenses for which wiretapping is permitted has been expanded steadily ever since . . . .
[W]iretapping is now authorized for cases involving false statements on passport applications and
loan applications or involving ‘any depredation’ against any property of the United States.”).
71. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 163 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2225.
72. Id. at xiii.
73. Id.

(8) 52.4_GRANICK (DO NOT DELETE)

1/6/2020 12:39 PM

442

[Vol. 52:431

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

•

“A majority of the Commission vigorously reaffirmed . . .
that electronic surveillance is an indispensable aid to law
enforcement . . . .”74
• “[T]he procedural requirements of Title III have
effectively minimized the invasion of individual privacy
in electronic surveillance investigations by law
enforcement officers.”75
• “A majority of the Commission concluded that electronic
surveillance could be used with significant success in the
investigation of Federal crimes not now included in the
enumerated crimes of Section 2516 of Title III . . . .”76
Not everyone shared these beliefs. A “substantial minority” of the
Commission, viewing the same evidence as the majority, concluded
that wiretapping only played a successful role in a limited number of
cases.77 Furthermore, this minority concluded that eight years of
legalized government wiretapping had “discouraged” law
enforcement’s use of traditional investigative techniques and still
resulted in “substantial invasions of personal privacy.”78
In sum, prior to 1968, the country periodically experimented with
banning law enforcement wiretapping. The Communications Act
meant to outlaw it, Attorneys General periodically gave it up, and
evidence obtained from it could not be used in court. Despite growing
awareness of surveillance abuses in the civil rights and Vietnam War
era,79 Congress authorized regulated wiretapping via Title III, and law
enforcement hasn’t looked back. Initially policymakers viewed the
legislation as a successful balancing.80 However, as the next Part
explains, in the years following Title III’s passage, the number of taps
has expanded significantly, electronic communications may now be
wiretapped in vast quantity even though the resulting privacy

74. Id. at xiv.
75. Id. at xvi.
76. Id. at xiii. The Report also stated that Title III had decreased the number of wiretaps in
some states immediately following the law’s passage, though these findings were based on
anecdotes rather than data.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1091 (“Between 1965 and 1974, the legislature held forty-seven hearings and
issued reports on privacy-related issues.”).
80. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at xiii (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2225.
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intrusions are more severe, and the remedies for illegal surveillance
are hard to obtain.
III. TITLE III HAS NOT NARROWLY RESTRICTED THE
USE OF WIRETAPPING
The frequency of wiretapping has increased dramatically since
Title III was enacted. Where law enforcement agencies conducted a
few hundred wiretaps in 1968, they now conduct thousands of
wiretaps each year.81 Moreover, according to data published by the
U.S. courts, a single wiretap today can sweep in millions of
communications.82 While this increase may partly reflect changing
communication habits, there is no question that the use of wiretapping
has become far more routine in criminal investigations.83 Over the
intervening decades, Congress has expanded the list of predicate
offenses that are eligible for wiretaps thirty-one times.84 What was
originally an investigative tool reserved primarily for national security
and organized crime investigations, can now be used to investigate a
vast range of offenses.

81. Title III Wiretap Orders - Stats, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR.,
https://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/wiretap_stats.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2019).
82. Wiretap Report 2018, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/wiretapreport-2018 (last updated Dec. 31, 2018) (“The federal wiretap with the most intercepts occurred
during a narcotics investigation in the Southern District of Texas and resulted in the interception of
9,208,906 messages in 120 days.”).
83. Infra app. A.
84. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2516 (West 2018).
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A. Wiretapping Has Increased Significantly in the Decades
Since Title III Was Enacted
Chart 1: Federal and State Wiretaps 1968–201785
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85. See Title III Wiretap Orders - Stats, supra note 81 (source of data for years 1968–2016);
Wiretap Report 2017, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/wiretap-report-2017
(last updated Dec. 31, 2017) (source of data for year 2017).
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Table 1: Federal and State Wiretaps Prior to 196886
Year Number of
Wiretaps
1940

687

1944

51788

1952

28589

1953

30090

1954

32291

Using data published by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, Chart 1 shows the rise in the use of wiretapping in the
five decades since Congress enacted Title III.92
To assess the extent to which wiretaps are used to intercept
Americans’ private conversations, however, one must also look at
another important measure: the number of communications collected
in the course of individual wiretaps. The average number of
intercepted communications has steadily increased since 1977.93 In
that year, the average number of communications intercepted was
658.94 By 2007 and 2017, those numbers had increased to 3,106 and
5,989 respectively.95 In 2016, a single wiretap resulted in the
interception of 3,292,285 conversations or messages.96 As noted
above, this increasing trend is likely a partial function of the changes
in the types of devices subject to wiretapping and the use of new

86. Wiretap data from before 1968 is sporadic and limited to offhand disclosures in
congressional hearings and committee reports.
87. NWC Report, supra note 1, at 36.
88. Id.
89. Levi Testimony, supra note 37, at 86.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Title III Wiretap Orders - Stats, supra note 81.
93. Infra app. A.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Wiretap Report 2016, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/wiretapreport-2016 (last updated Dec. 31, 2016).
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communications technologies, such as text-based messaging.97 As a
result, today’s statistics show that wiretaps result in the collection of a
staggering number of communications.
Despite the statute’s reporting requirements, some scholars have
raised concerns that the official number of wiretaps is inaccurately
low.98 Recently, companies have started publishing “transparency
reports” about the number and nature of government demands to
access their users’ data.99 AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and T-Mobile
publish such reports.100 In aggregate, just these four companies state
that they implemented three times as many wiretaps as the total
number reported by the Administrative Office of the Courts.101
B. The List of Predicate Offenses for Wiretapping Has Expanded
Following Title III’s passage, Congress wasted little time in
expanding the number and categories of crimes that could justify
wiretapping. In 1968, nearly all of the twenty-four categories of
offenses listed in Title III had a clear relationship to national security
or organized crime.102 Since then, Congress has amended 18 U.S.C.
§ 2516—the section of Title III that enumerates wiretap-worthy
offenses—thirty-one times.103 By 2018, § 2516(c) authorized wiretaps
for cases relating to: “transportation for illegal sexual activity and
related crimes”; “failure to appear” in court; “mail fraud”; “computer
fraud and abuse”; “reproduction of naturalization or citizenship
papers”; and “false statements in passport applications.”104
Investigations into obscenity105 and theft of medical products106 now
qualify, too.

97. See Dempsey, supra note 70, at 78–80.
98. See Albert Gidari, Wiretap Numbers Don’t Add Up, JUST SECURITY (July 6, 2015),
https://www.justsecurity.org/24427/wiretap-numbers-add.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.; Albert Gidari, Wiretap Numbers Still Don’t Add Up, STAN. L. SCH.: CTR. FOR
INTERNET
&
SOC’Y
(Nov. 29,
2016,
11:15
AM),
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2016/11/wiretap-numbers-still-dont-add.
102. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2516(a) (effective June 19, 1968) (authorizing wiretaps in investigations
“relating to treason”); id. § 2516(c) (authorizing wiretaps in investigations relating to “bribery of
public officials and witnesses”).
103. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2516 (West 2018).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(c) (2012).
105. Id. § 2516(i).
106. Id. § 2516(s).
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In 1969 and 1977, wiretaps were used most often to investigate
gambling offenses, making up 30 to 40 percent of the totals, but drugrelated offenses were a close second.107 Since then, drug-related
offenses have consistently taken the lead, making up roughly 50 to
80 percent of intercept orders and applications from 1987 to the
present.108
C. Title III’s “Necessity” Requirement Has Not
Been Strictly Enforced
Title III requires that every wiretap application include a
statement as to other investigative procedures used prior to the
application and why other investigative procedures reasonably appear
unlikely to succeed, or are too dangerous to be tried.109 This provision,
known as the necessity requirement, is “designed to assure that
wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where traditional
investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime.”110
Courts of appeals, however, have not applied the necessity
requirement to require a showing that all possible alternatives have
failed or are not reasonably likely to succeed. The requirement has
proved to be more of an opportunity for reflection than an actual
limitation on unnecessary use of a highly invasive investigative
technique.111 The Seventh Circuit, for example, has stated that
“[w]iretaps do not have to be used only as a last resort in an
investigation,” as “[t]he evil” that the necessity requirement is
intended to avoid is only “the routine use of wiretaps as an initial step
in the investigation.”112 For that reason, the court held that “the
government’s burden of proving necessity is not extraordinarily high,
and our view is not hyper-technical.”113 Other appeals courts have
107. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS
AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNICATIONS tbl. 3
(1978); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS
AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNICATIONS tbl. 2
(1970); infra app. A.
108. Infra app. A.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c).
110. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n.12 (1974).
111. See United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554, 565 (5th Cir. 1974) (“[T]he purpose of the
requirement in section 2518(1)(c) is not to foreclose electronic surveillance until every other
imaginable method of investigation has been unsuccessfully attempted, but simply to inform the
issuing judge of the difficulties involved in the use of conventional techniques.”).
112. United States v. Fudge, 325 F.3d 910, 919 (7th Cir. 2003).
113. Id.
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similarly concluded that the government’s burden to demonstrate
necessity “is not great.”114 “All that is required [from the government]
is that the investigators give serious consideration to the non-wiretap
techniques prior to applying for wiretap authority and that the court be
informed of the reasons for the investigators’ belief that such nonwiretap techniques have been or will likely be inadequate.”115
IV. TITLE III’S PRIVACY PROTECTIONS HAVE ERODED OVER TIME
Finally, this Part explains how the various provisions in Title III
that were meant to limit privacy intrusions, and to ensure that
investigators complied with those protections, have significantly
eroded over time.
A. Implementation of the Wiretap Act’s Minimization Requirement
Title III mandates that law enforcement wiretaps “shall be
conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception under this
chapter.”116 Minimization is an important means to protect the privacy
of innocent third parties. It also protects the privacy of individuals who
are being investigated, implicitly acknowledging their humanity—a
person may be suspected of breaking the law, but she still has a right
to private conversations with her mother, doctor, etc.
The minimization requirement, however, has not proven as strict
or effective as some might suggest. In practice, courts have generally
set a low bar in terms of what minimization requires and—as

114. United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 38 (3d Cir. 1975).
115. United States v. Alfano, 838 F.2d 158, 163–164 (6th Cir. 1988); see also United States v.
Canales Gomez, 358 F.3d 1221, 1225–26 (9th Cir. 2004) (“wiretap should not ordinarily be the
initial step in the investigation” but “law enforcement officials need not exhaust every conceivable
alternative before obtaining a wiretap” (citation omitted)); United States v. Santana, 342 F.3d 60,
65 (1st Cir. 2003) (“government need not demonstrate that it exhausted all investigative
procedures”); United States v. Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 1997) (the
“‘necessity’ requirement of Title III is not an ‘exhaustion’ requirement,” and “law enforcement
officials are not required to exhaust all other conceivable investigative procedures before resorting
to wiretapping” (citation omitted)); United States v. Garcia, 785 F.2d 214, 223 (8th Cir. 1986)
(wiretap application “need not explain away all possible alternative techniques because
investigators are not required to use wiretaps or eavesdropping devices only as a last resort”);
United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554,at 565 (5th Cir. 1974) (purpose of the exhaustion
requirement is “simply to inform the issuing judge of the difficulties involved in the use of
conventional techniques”).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2012).
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discussed further below—courts rarely require suppression even when
they find that the minimization requirement has been violated.
Courts give law enforcement significant leeway in what they are
required to minimize. In the seminal case examining the minimization
requirement, the Supreme Court declined to enumerate clear
guidelines regarding minimization, instead emphasizing that the
reasonableness of an officer’s efforts to minimize wiretapped
communications “will depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case.”117 Though the officers in that case had intercepted “virtually
all” of the target’s conversations, only 40 percent of which were
related to the criminal investigation, the Court rejected petitioners’ bid
for suppression.118 Justices Brennan and Marshall, in dissent,
criticized the opinion as contributing to a “process of myopic,
incremental denigration of Title III’s safeguards.”119 Courts since have
given law enforcement a lot of leeway in satisfying the minimization
requirement, even when investigators recorded and retained
innocent—or even clearly privileged—conversations, such as
conversations with lawyers or doctors.120
Minimization may be even more lax in the context of “electronic
communications.” In 1986, the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (ECPA) amended Title III to extend its privacy protections to
“electronic” as well as “wire” and “oral” communications.121 It is not
entirely clear how the minimization requirement functions in the
electronic context because the type of real-time minimization required

117. Id. at 140.
118. Id. at 132, 143.
119. Id. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. See, e.g., United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 800, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (interception
of calls between defendant and his wife, lawyer, and doctor were unreasonable, but the government
nonetheless observed proper minimization overall); see also United States v. Scurry, 821 F.3d 1,
18 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (rejecting minimization challenge on the grounds that “to challenge the
reasonableness of the government’s minimization efforts, a party must present more than the raw
number of non-pertinent intercepted calls and their durations”); United States v. Charles, 213 F.3d
10, 21–23 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that minimization of phone calls involving attorneys was
sufficient based on (1) the nature and complexity of the suspected crimes, (2) the thoroughness of
the government precautions to bring about minimization, and (3) the degree of judicial supervision
over the surveillance practices); United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.3d 1294, 1307 (2d Cir. 1987)
(rejecting minimization challenge where officers intercepted innocent calls because the
investigation “involved factors such as the presence of ambiguous or coded language, a conspiracy
thought to be widespread, and the fact that the phone tapped was located in the residence of a person
thought to be the head of a major drug ring”).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (1986), Pub. L. 99–508.
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for wiretapped telephone calls cannot easily be applied to electronic
communications. As stated in the ECPA Senate Report:
[T]he technology used to either transmit or intercept an
electronic message such as electronic mail or a computer data
transmission ordinarily will not make it possible to shut
down the interception and taping or recording equipment
simultaneously in order to minimize in the same manner as
with a wire interception. It is impossible to ‘listen’ to a
computer and determine when to stop listening and minimize
as it is possible to do in listening to a telephone conversation.
For instance, a page displayed on a screen during a computer
transmission might have five paragraphs of which the second
and third are relevant to the investigation and the others are
not. The printing technology is such that the whole page
including the irrelevant paragraphs, would have to be printed
and read, before anything can be done about minimization.122
The Report contemplated that because “minimization for computer
transmissions would require a somewhat different procedure than that
used to minimize a telephone call, . . . the minimization should be
conducted by the initial law enforcement officials who review the
transcript.”123 It would then be the role of those officials to “delete all
non-relevant materials and disseminate to other officials only that
information which is relevant to the investigation.”124
Cases examining the minimization requirement in the context of
electronic communications appear to be rare. Based on the limited
amount of information available on minimization in the context of
electronic wiretaps, it seems that generally, law enforcement collects
all of the intercepted electronic communications, which a designated
officer then reviews in order to identify and segregate the pertinent
communications.125 There are no authorities making clear how
122.
123.
124.
125.

S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 31.
Id.
Id.
See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ELEC. SURVEILLANCE MANUAL: PROCEDURES AND CASE LAW
FORMS 14 (2005), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal/legacy/2014/10/29/elec-surmanual.pdf (stating that “[a]fter-the-fact minimization is a necessity for the interception of
electronic communications such as cell phone or pager text messages, facsimile transmissions, and
internet transmissions such as e-mail and images,” and explaining that “[i]n such cases, all
communications are recorded and then examined by a monitoring agent and/or a supervising
attorney to determine their relevance to the investigation,” and that “[d]isclosure is then limited to
those communications by the subjects or their confederates that are criminal in nature”); see also

(8) 52.4_GRANICK (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

WIRETAP ACT ‘SUPER WARRANTS’

1/6/2020 12:39 PM

451

electronic communications that investigators initially deem nonpertinent are treated—i.e., whether they are deleted, sealed in some
fashion, retained by the original investigators, or made available for
subsequent querying.126 In sum, permitting seizure of communications
in their entirety and letting law enforcement sort out the material for
which there is probable cause afterward creates the opportunity for farwider reaching privacy invasions.
The infrequency of court cases applying the minimization
requirement to wiretaps of electronic communications may be due
both to inadequacy of notice to affected individuals and to the fact that
ECPA did not extend Title III’s statutory suppression remedy to
electronic communications. Moreover, even when the minimization
requirement is violated in the context of telephone calls, courts rarely
require suppression (as discussed further in suppression section
below), and the statute provides no civil remedy. In the majority of
cases, there are no consequences to investigators for a failure to
effectively minimize.
B. Implementation of the Wiretap Act’s Notice Provisions
The Wiretap Act requires that the court inform an individual who
is the target of a wiretap application about the “fact” and “date” of the
wiretap, and whether “wire or electronic communications” were or
were not intercepted.127 Notice is supposed to occur “[w]ithin a
reasonable time but no later than ninety days” after the wiretap, unless
a judge allows for postponing notice.128 Title III further provides that
a judge may determine in his or her discretion that it is “in the interest
of justice” to require notice to individuals whose communications are

United States v. McGuire, 307 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2002) (regarding an electronic wiretap of a fax,
law enforcement need not mimic minimization of telephone calls by skipping lines if a fax appeared
non-pertinent; rather, law enforcement may look at every communication collected by an electronic
wiretap and then separate out non-pertinent communication); United States v. Harvey, No. 4:0200482-JCH-DDN, 2003 WL 22052993, at *8 (E.D. Mo. July 28, 2003) (describing minimization
process by which email communications were intercepted, copied in their entirety, stored, and
reviewed by designated personnel to determine whether communications appeared pertinent to
criminal activity, with non-pertinent communications then sealed and made unavailable to the
investigators).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199 (2d. Cir. 2016) (non-responsive materials
seized pursuant to a November 2003 warrant still in law enforcement possession and available for
querying in April 2006).
127. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2012).
128. Id. § 2518(8)(d).
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incidentally overheard.129 Notice is critical for public transparency,
oversight, and accountability. Finally, Title III also requires notice to
any party in a trial or legal proceeding where the government intends
to introduce the contents of an intercepted communication “or
evidence derived therefrom.”130
Because wiretaps are conducted in secret, notice is crucial for
accountability. Without notice, individuals who have been subject to
unlawful wiretaps are generally unable to pursue the remedies for
violations of Title III or the Fourth Amendment.
However, some courts have held that notice to the electronic
service provider, and not to the intercepted parties, is adequate.131
Despite the importance of this procedural safeguard, the extent to
which courts require notice to individuals who are incidentally
overheard is unclear because most jurisdictions do not appear to
collect or publish data. Similarly, the extent to which federal and state
authorities comply with the statute’s notice requirement—both for
those who are targeted and those who are incidentally overheard—is
difficult to assess.132 While the federal government keeps records
regarding instances of wiretapping,133 these records do not provide
information about whether notices were sent to those who have been
wiretapped.134 As a result, publicly available information about
wiretap notices derives mostly from individuals and attorneys sharing
their firsthand accounts.135

129. Id.
130. Id. § 2518(9).
131. In re United States, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1221–22 (D. Or. 2009).
132. For example, the Department of Justice has refused to disclose how it interprets Title III’s
requirement that it provide notice to criminal defendants when evidence is “derived” from a
wiretap. An unjustifiably narrow interpretation of this requirement would allow the government to
conceal wiretaps in criminal cases, depriving individuals who face prosecution of the opportunity
to challenge those wiretaps and the resulting evidence. In 2016, DOJ sent all federal prosecutors a
policy memorandum titled, “Determining Evidence is ‘Derived From’ Surveillance Under Title III
or FISA.” Although this memorandum sets forth DOJ’s official interpretation of its duty to provide
notice, DOJ has refused to release the document publicly. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Am.
Civil Liberties Union v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 4:17-cv-03571-JSW, 2019 WL 2619664 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 15, 2019).
133. Wiretap Report 2017, supra note 85.
134. Fred P. Graham, Can You Find Out if Your Telephone Is Tapped?, ESQUIRE (May 1973),
http://www.bugsweeps.com/info/esquire_5-73.html.
135. Bill Torpy, DeKalb Wiretap Notices Causing Consternation, ATLANTA J.-CONST.
(Sept. 7, 2013), https://www.ajc.com/news/local-govt—politics/dekalb-wiretap-notices-causingconsternation/OoH4BnUGlzUBB7GerWP1JI/; Jeff German, DA Sends 230 Wiretap Notices Amid
Nevada Assembly Extortion Probe, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (June 10, 2015, 2:39 PM),
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Similarly, most states that have their own wiretap provisions and
notice regulations decline to publish records of wiretap notices.
California appears to be the only state that makes data concerning the
number “inventory notices” provided publicly available—and even
California’s records do not appear to go back before 2009.136
California’s reports show that, in many instances, only a small
fraction of the individuals whose communications are intercepted
receive notice that they were subject to surveillance.137 For example,
in 2018, one series of wiretaps intercepted the communications of
1,739 people—ensnaring 91,111 communications in the process—but
notice was given to only 345 individuals.138
Without notice, people whose communications have been
intercepted have no way of knowing that investigators have listened
in on their private conversations and no way of determining whether
that intrusion was lawful or not. Similarly, without notice, the public
has limited ability to oversee and to incentivize careful use of
wiretapping.
C. Implementation of Title III’s Suppression Remedy
1. Congressional Intent and Statutory Background
To incentivize compliance with the Wiretap Act’s requirements,
the statute includes a mandatory suppression remedy.139 The Wiretap
Act’s legislative history indicates that Congress believed the
suppression remedy was necessary to protect privacy and enforce the
Act’s limitations. Congress was clear that the prohibition on
unauthorized interception “must be enforced with all appropriate
sanctions.”140 Congress explained that “[t]he perpetrator [of unlawful
interception] must be denied the fruits of his unlawful actions in civil
https://www.reviewjournal.com/local/local-las-vegas/da-sends-230-wiretap-notices-amid-nevadaassembly-extortion-probe/.
136. Publications, ST. OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/publications#electronic (last
visited Nov. 26, 2019).
137. Due to the timing of these annual reports, it can be difficult to determine the degree to
which notice was ultimately provided to affected individuals, if at all, because delayed notice orders
remained in effect when the report was issued. This gap represents another flaw in the available
data.
138. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. CALIFORNIA ELECTRONICS INTERCEPTIONS REPORT 7,
30
(2018),
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/publications/annual-rept-legislature2018.pdf (providing statistics for interception number 2019-CC-19).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2012).
140. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 69 (1968).
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and criminal proceedings.”141 The suppression remedy was intended
to “sharply curtail the unlawful interception of wire and oral
communications.”142 The legislative history also suggests that the
remedy was meant to reflect constitutional interpretations of
suppression remedies as they existed at the time. Congress sought to
roughly codify the “suppression role” as it was understood in the
prevailing “search and seizure law” in 1968.143
2. Implementation with Regard to Wire and Oral Communications
Since the Wiretap Act’s enactment, judicial interpretations have
narrowed the suppression remedy’s scope in three ways. Although
some of these interpretations parallel efforts to narrow the judicially
created exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations, the
Wiretap Act’s suppression remedy has an independent basis in the
statute.144 As a result, some of these rulings appear at odds with the
compulsory language of the Wiretap Act145 and with Congress’s view
that suppression would be an integral remedy to protect privacy.146
First, some circuits have grafted the Fourth Amendment’s goodfaith exception onto the Wiretap Act’s statutory suppression
remedy.147 They have done this even though the Supreme Court case
that established the good-faith exception, United States v. Leon,148
came after the 1968 Wiretap Act, and thus Congress could not have
intended to incorporate it.

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 96 (citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 2515.
145. Id. §§ 2515, 2518(10)(a).
146. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 69.
147. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 204 F. App’x 205, 208 (4th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that
Fourth Amendment good-faith exception can justify rejection of an otherwise valid suppression
motion); United States v. Moore, 41 F.3d 370, 376 (8th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that the Leon
good faith exception pertains to the Fourth Amendment, but interpreting the legislative history of
the Wiretap Act as instructing courts to “adopt suppression principles developed in Fourth
Amendment cases”). But see United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 524 (1974) (where there
exists a statutory suppression remedy, the terms of the statute govern, as opposed to the terms of
the “judicially fashioned” Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule); United States v. Glover, 736 F.3d
509, 515–16 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United States v. Rice, 478 F.3d 704, 711–13 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding
that the good faith exception does not apply to Wiretap Act suppression motions due to differences
between legislative and judicial exclusionary rules); United States v. Spadaccino, 800 F.2d 292,
296 (2d Cir. 1986).
148. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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Second, some courts have developed a plain view-type exception
for the suppression remedy. In United States v. Carey,149 the FBI
obtained an intercept order for a particular individual’s phone number,
but the FBI later learned the phone was used by another person.150
Before realizing the error, the FBI intercepted a number of
incriminating phone calls.151 The user of the phone, after being
charged with a crime based on some of the intercepted
communications, moved to suppress the evidence because the
intercept order related to a separate individual.152 Relying on the plain
view doctrine from Fourth Amendment case law, the court reasoned
that incriminating evidence obtained prior to the discovery that the
target was not using the phone was admissible.153
Third, the Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to
distinguish between “material” and “immaterial” deviations from the
warrant requirements.154 That has created two classes of statutory
violations—ones that lead to suppression, and ones that do not. Only
a “failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly
and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the
use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the
employment of [the] extraordinary investigative device” justify
suppression.155
Similarly, in Scott v. United States,156 the Court rejected the
petitioners’ argument that an agent’s failure to make subjective, goodfaith efforts to comply with minimization procedures required
suppression.157 The Court held that courts should look only to agents’
actions, not motives, and those actions should be evaluated based on a
reasonableness requirement.158 The Court further noted that the
interception of a high number of non-incriminating calls is not in itself
sufficient to show a failure to comply with minimization

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

836 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1094.
Id.
Id.
See also United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 851 (7th Cir. 1997).
United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974).
Id. (quoting United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 526 (1974)).
436 U.S. 128 (1978).
Id.
Id. at 139–40.
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procedures.159 It is odd that good faith can justify dispensing with the
suppression remedy, but bad faith doesn’t warrant suppression.
There does not appear to be any empirical research on the number
of suppression motions that are granted or denied. Recently, the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts began publishing
data, as part of its statutory reporting requirements, that shows whether
suppression motions are pending, denied, or granted in cases where
intercepts led to arrests and criminal proceedings.160 But this
information appears to be incomplete because it depends on reports
filed by prosecutors.
One clear trend in interpretations of the suppression remedy,
however, is that many courts have diluted the strength of this remedy
over time. For example, as discussed above, some circuit courts have
created a good-faith exception, borrowing from Fourth Amendment
case law that did not exist when Congress passed the Wiretap Act.161
As the Supreme Court appears to be increasingly hostile to the
exclusionary rule, the statutory suppression remedy could be further
diluted.
3. No Suppression Remedy for Illegal Interception of
Electronic Communications
Congress, also, has declined to extend the statute’s suppression
remedy to new types of communications.162 While a person may move
to suppress “the contents of any wire or oral communication”
intercepted pursuant to Title III, or evidence derived therefrom, if the
wiretap did not comply with Title III’s requirements, no such remedy
exists in regards to the contents of electronic communications.163 The
decision not to extend the suppression remedy to electronic
communications was, according to the Senate Report, made “as a
result of discussions with the Justice Department.”164
159. Id. at 140.
160. See, e.g., Table Wire A1—Appendix Tables Wiretap, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 31, 2018),
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/wire-a1/wiretap/2018/12/31.
161. E.g., United States v. Brewer, 204 F. App’x 205, 208 (4th Cir. 2006).
162. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 23 (1986).
163. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (2012) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Steiger, 318
F.3d 1039, 1052 (11th Cir. 2003) (“The Wiretap Act does not provide a suppression remedy for
electronic communications unlawfully acquired under the Act.”); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v.
U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Meriwether, 917
F.2d 955, 960 (6th Cir. 1990) (same).
164. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 23 (1986).
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The absence of a mandatory suppression remedy under the statute
reduces the government’s incentive to comply with the statutory
safeguards and may disincentivize criminal defendants from litigating
privacy rights in electronic communications, potentially masking
illegal surveillance that affects other private citizens.
D. Civil Remedies and Criminal Penalties
While Congress has long recognized the importance of providing
civil remedies to victims of Wiretap Act violations and imposing
criminal sanctions on violators, the remedies provided are primarily
directed at private citizens who engage in unlawful wiretapping.165
They do little to disincentivize violations by law enforcement except
in the most egregious cases.
In enacting the Wiretap Act, Congress recognized that “[i]t is not
enough . . . just to prohibit the unjustifiable interception, disclosure, or
use of any wire or oral communications.”166 “Criminal penalties have
their part to play.”167 Accordingly, a Wiretap Act violation is a Class
D felony, and, subject to specific exceptions, violations of the Act may
result in fines and/or imprisonment for up to five years.168 Congress
also noted that “remedies must be afforded the victim of an unlawful
invasion of privacy,” including “civil recourse.”169 Victims of Wiretap
Act violations may therefore generally seek equitable or declaratory
relief and damages from violators.170
The exact contours of the civil remedy have changed over time.
For example, the civil remedy originally provided for a civil suit for
injunctive relief and damages against “any person” who violated the
Wiretap Act, then extended liability to “any person or entity,” and later
narrowed the scope of the remedy contained in section 2520 to provide
a cause of action against “any person or entity, other than the United
States.”171 Today, civil suits for money damages against the United
States for Wiretap Act violations are authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 2712.
165. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, Oct. 26, 2001, 115 Stat. 272 (extending liability under the Wiretap
Act to “any person or entity, other than the United States”).
166. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2156 (1968).
167. Id.
168. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (setting penalties); id. § 3559(a)(4) (classifying sentence).
169. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2156 (1968).
170. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520.
171. Compare Pub. L. No. 90-351, June 19, 1968, 82 Stat. 197 (“any person”), with Pub. L. No.
99-508, Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 1848 (“any person or entity”), and Pub. L. No. 107-56, Oct. 26,
2001, 115 Stat. 272 (“any person or entity, other than the United States”).
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Nonetheless, neither the civil nor criminal remedies have functioned
to effectively remedy the vast majority of Wiretap Act violations by
government actors.
This is partly due to carve-outs that shield government actors
from liability except for the most flagrant violations of the statute.
Most notably, good faith is a complete defense against any criminal or
civil action, providing a safe harbor for law enforcement officers and
individuals acting at the behest of law enforcement officers who act in
good faith reliance on legal process, such as a court warrant or
order.172 Accordingly, remedies are unlikely to apply where law
enforcement officers obtain a court order, so long as the officer had a
reasonable, good-faith belief that he acted legally pursuant to a court
order.173 Civil remedies are generally off the table when officers have
a court order but subsequently violate the Act’s core requirements,
such as by failing to minimize the collection of private
communications.174 Additionally, the Act’s prohibition on the use of a
“device” to intercept an oral communication explicitly excepts devices
that are “used by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the
ordinary course of his duties.”175 In addition, to the extent that the
government fails to provide notice of wiretapping to targets or others,
victims of unlawful wiretaps have no way to even attempt to obtain a
remedy. Perhaps for this reason, the civil remedy provisions that
theoretically allow victims to seek remedies for wiretap violations are
rarely utilized against government actors.
Further, it appears that criminal prosecutions are initiated against
government actors for Wiretap Act violations only in cases of blatant
abuse—for example, where a law enforcement officer has forged
wiretap orders to spy on a love interest.176
Ultimately, then, while private actors who violate the Wiretap Act
may face civil or criminal penalties, law enforcement officials who
172. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(d); see GINA STEVENS & CHARLES DOYLE, PRIVACY: AN OVERVIEW
FEDERAL STATUTES GOVERNING WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING 18–19
(2003), https://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/98-326.pdf.
173. Jacobson v. Rose, 592 F.2d 515, 523 (9th Cir. 1978). A defendant may assert a good-faith
defense where: (1) “he had a subjective good faith belief that he acted legally pursuant to a court
order”; and (2) “this belief was reasonable.” Id.
174. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(d)(1).
175. Id. § 2510(5)(a)(ii).
176. See Staci Zaretsky, Ex-Prosecutor Disbarred for Forging Wiretap Orders to Spy on Love
Interest, ABOVE L. (Jan. 4, 2018), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/01/ex-prosecutor-disbarred-forforging-wiretap-orders-to-spy-on-love-interest/.
OF
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violate the statute or court wiretapping orders face few effective
penalties.
V. GOING FORWARD
Going forward, advocates should be aware that a Title III-style
super-warrant is not a panacea for privacy concerns—and may
ultimately expand the use of an invasive investigative technique by
legitimizing it. As the experience with wiretapping shows, initially
strong limits can quickly erode. Merely parroting current Title III
language in legislative proposals will not constitute strong limits,
given current judicial interpretations of Title III. Should super-warrant
procedures be considered, advocates will have to draft new language
to effectively implement the intended safeguards behind Title III. In
particular:
• The requirement that investigators show “necessity”
before employing an intrusive technique should be
demanding and should rely on clear, objective criteria.
• Minimization requirements should be strict, should
impose concrete default rules, and should require that
non-responsive data or data belonging to innocent third
parties be promptly purged.
• Notice to affected parties should be required by default.
Judges should have to explain in writing, on the basis of
case-specific facts, when there is an exception or when
notice is temporarily delayed. The number of affected
parties who receive and who do not receive notice should
be tracked and publicly reported.
• Statutory suppression remedies should be clearly defined
and, where appropriate, should be stated in unambiguous,
mandatory terms. A statute should be precise in
identifying the specific violations that can justify
suppression. A statute should also be clear that its
suppression remedy is independent of any Fourth
Amendment remedies or exceptions. A statute may have
to state, for example, that there is no good-faith exception.
• A statute may need to provide for civil remedies and
provide standing to sue.
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•

Transparency reporting may often be helpful, but it is far
from sufficient in preventing the widespread use of novel
surveillance techniques.

VI. CONCLUSION
The raw number of wiretap orders has increased dramatically
since 1968. At the same time, the limitations built into the statute have
been watered down or have otherwise proven to be less effective over
time than many may assume at first glance. This history offers critical
lessons as privacy advocates and policymakers consider regulations
for face surveillance, familial DNA searches, government hacking,
and other new surveillance technologies. The history of American
wiretap law suggests that existing Wiretap Act protections are not a
turn-key model for mitigating privacy risks in the face of new
surveillance technologies.
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APPENDIX A
Wiretap Report Data Comparison Sample
Category
Total Intercept
Applications
Approved
Most Common
Major Offense
Specified

2017177

2007178

1997179

1987180

1977181

1969182

3,813

2,208

1,186

673

626

304

Narcotics

Narcotics

Narcotics

Narcotics

Gambling

(2,027)

(1,792)

(870)

(379)

(265)

Gambling
and
Bookmaking

[53%]

[81%]

[73%]

[50%]

[42%]

(102)

(Number)
[Percentage of
Total]

[34%]

Most Common
Location of
Authorized
Intercepts

Portable
Device

Portable
Device

Other

Single
Family
Dwelling

Single
Family
Dwelling

Residence

(Number)

(3,584)

(2,078)

(529)

(285)

(253)

(135)

Total Intercepts
Installed

2,421

2,119

1,094

634

601

271

177. Wiretap Reports, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysisreports/wiretap-reports (last visited Nov. 26, 2019).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. STAT. ANALYSIS & REP. DIVISION, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON
APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE, ORAL,
OR
ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS
24,
tbl.7
(1990),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/125933NCJRS.pdf.
181. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS
AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE, ORAL, OR ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS
21
tbl.7
(1985),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/98312NCJRS.pdf.
182. NWC Report, supra note 1, at 36, 277.
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Wiretap Report Data Comparison Sample (continued)
Category

2017183

2007184

1997185

1987186

1977187

Average Number of
Persons Intercepted

149

94

197

104

72

Average Number of
Intercepted
Communications

5,989

3,106

2,081

1,299

658

1,178

920

418

230

268

1,228

[20%]

[29%]

[20%]

[17%]

[40%]

(Federal)

Average Number of
Incriminating
Intercepted
Communications
[Percentage of
Average Number of
Intercepted
Communications]

1969188

152
(Federal)
1,498
(Federal)

183. Wiretap Reports, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysisreports/wiretap-reports (last visited Nov. 26, 2019).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. STAT. ANALYSIS & REP. DIVISION, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON
APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE, ORAL,
OR
ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS
24,
tbl.7
(1990),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/125933NCJRS.pdf.
187. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS
AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE, ORAL, OR ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS
21
tbl.7
(1985),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/98312NCJRS.pdf.
188. NWC Report, supra note 1, at 36, 277.

